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DEFINING THE THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF HUMANITY 
In order to answer the question posed by the title of this paper, we must 
first agree on what we mean by a "theological understanding of humanity." The 
most obvious sense of the phrase would be the understanding of human nature 
as defined by the councils and creeds of the Church. However, the creeds of the 
Church do not give us a statement of the nature of humanity sufficiently defini-
tive to allow us to draw any direct conclusions about efforts to develop Artifi-
cial Intelligence (hereafter Al). 
Creeds shared by Protestants, Roman Catholics and Orthodox Catholics 
tell us that we have been created (both physical body and rational soul) in the 
image of God, that we have somehow fallen from the grace of our original 
state, that our nature was assumed in its entirety (both physical body and ra-
tional soul) by the Son of God, that our bodies will be raised from the dead, 
and that we will be judged for things we have done in this life. 
Councils recognized by the Roman Catholic Church add the more techni-
cal points that humans have one and only one soul each (against Averroists and 
Manichaeans) and that the soul is the form of the body (an Aristotelian term)--
in other words, the soul gives each of us our distinct personality and character. 1 
Both Catholic and Reformed standards generally affirm that the soul is dis-
tinct from the body and continues to exist after the death of the body (the inter-
mediate state), but they say little about its exact relationship to the body in this 
life.2 
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These statements are not definitive for our purposes for two reasons. For 
one thing, the times in which these articles of faith were form ulated were ones 
in which the possibility of AI was not even being considered as a viable re-
search program. In fact, the theologians of the early Church regarded many 
questions of science as hopelessly speculative--not because they were opposed 
to science as such, but because there was at that time no prospect o f ever being 
able to develop the instruments needed lo decide the truth of such mallers. 
For example, Irenaeus regarded speculation about the migration of birds and 
the causes of meteorological phenomena like rain, thunder and lightening (all 
treated on speculative grounds in A ristotle's Mcteorologica) as e ntirely futilc.3 
Basil said the same concerning discussions about what supported the earth in 
space.4 Theophilus took it as granted that humans could never produce ma-
chines that would have the capacity for motion or sensation, let alone rcason.5 
We must keep in mind that the technologies that make modern scie nce 
possible arc only a few hundred years o ld, and they place us in a context of sci-
entific, political and moral possibilities quite d ifferent from that of the early, 
medieval and R eformation Church from which most of ou r confessional state-
ments come. So it would make no more sense to derive implicat ions concern-
ing AI from Christian doctrine in a st raight forward, logical man ner than it 
would to make judgments about the theory of evolution on the basis o f the 
book of Genesis. If we arc to derive any results al all, we shall have to do so by 
focusing on the underlying idea of the im age of God in humanity and by consid-
ering the implications that idea has had historically for the development of 
modern science. 
A second reason for saying that Church dogma is not definit ive by itself has 
to do with our understanding of hum anity. If we know anything about human 
nature, it is that it is highly malleable. In contrast to other social animals like 
ants and bees (less so to cetaceans and the higher primates), humans arc gov-
erned by their social and cultu ral conditions as much as by their genes. Our 
brains, for instance, are programmed by genetic material only in a very general 
way. As Jean-Pierre Changeux and others have pointed out , the nu mber of 
genes in the human genome, roughly HP (one hundred thousand), immense as 
it may be seem to us, is only a small fraction of the number of synaptic connec-
tions in the human brain, roughly 1015 (one quadrill ion) .6 The d ifference is a 
factor of 1010 (ten billion)! We do not know just how the inst ructions for the 
init ial formation of the brain are encoded in the human genome, but the struc-
ture of the mature brain is clearly underdetermined, genetically speaki ng. In 
other words, the format ion of the brain and mind is cont rolled by interpersonal 
and environmental factors as much as it is by the genotype. 
This malleabili ty of human nature means that humans arc largely what they 
make of themselves from one generation to the next: depending on our culture, 
we define ourselves through the structuring of our social relations, the degree 
of individual freedom in relation to group identity, the structures of our tech-
nology, moral values and religion. 
Technological structures arc a particularly important aspect of the cultural 
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formation of human nature. In the modern West, we recognize that thought 
and behavior of humans is rather different in a technological society than it is in 
a more traditional one.7 But the process of human self-definition has always 
been in a symbiotic relation to the development of human technology.8 We get 
hints of this as early as in the book of Genesis where the image of God is 
closely related to human dominion over nature--a dominion which is described 
in contemporary images of agriculture, the domestication of animals and metal-
lurgy (Gen 1:28-29; 2:15-20; 4:20-22). 
One of the most exciting, and sometimes frightening, aspects of the current 
computer revolution is the fact that we are asking questions about ourselves 
with renewed intensity. Are certain human traits potentialities within the laws 
that govern matter itself? Can we replicate ourselves through technology as 
well as we can through sexual reproduction? If not, which are the characteris-
tics that cannot be reproduced in machines and why? How does all this relate 
to our understanding of the "image of God" within us? Does it tell us some-
thing about the relation of matter and spirit? 
AI research is not just a narrow specialty that nonspecialists can ignore. 
While it is not as readily marketable, in the economic sense, as the "expert sys-
tems" that sometimes go by the name of Al, it confronts us anew with the cen-
tral questions of our own human existence. 
If and when the verdict is in on the viability of Al as a research program, 
we will all be in a belter position to define our own nature than we are at pres-
ent. Our "theological understanding of humanity" is grounded in the creeds of 
the Church, but it is not spelled out in explicit terms that would allow us to 
predetermine what can or will be. What ought to be is another question. 
THE IMAGE OF GOD AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
So the theological understanding of humanity is not determinative in any 
straightforward sense: it docs not have a fixed, explicit meaning, and it is sub-
ject to reinterpretation in every age. Historically, however, the theological un-
derstanding of humanity has had important and influential meaning for the de-
velopment of Western culture. And, since the quest for Al is very much a prod-
uct of Western technology and philosophy,9 this particular expression of the 
theological tradition is relevant to our concerns. 
In fact, much of the confidence in human reason and human ingenuity that 
has made modern science possible was initially inspired by belief in one of the 
theological doctrines I mentioned earlier--belief in the creation of humans in 
the image of God. Traditionally this belief has had two correlates: that humans 
could know and understand the world God had created and that they could 
make moral judgments. Humans were believed to reflect the divine mind--the 
same mind that authored the laws of nature, and humans were believed to be 
accountable to the divine will--the same will that authored the moral law.10 
These two ideas are the epistemic and ethical correlates of belief in the crea-
tion of humanity in the image of God. Together they constitute the historic 
Western theological understanding of human intelligence. This is just one tradi-
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tion, but it is the tradition out of which the modern scientific quest was born. It 
is, therefore, the tradition to which we must refer back insofar as we want to 
know the meaning of the scientific enterprise as it has developed historically in 
the West. 
THE IMAGE OF GOD AND REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE 
(EPISTEMIC CORRELA TE) 
The idea that the divine mind is reflected in human intelligence--the epis-
temic correlate--goes back to the wisdom tradition of ancient Israel and to the 
Platonic tradition of classical Greece. Both Hebrew and Greek traditions were 
rooted in the mythology and cosmology of the ancient Near East. But the prin-
ciple vector for transmitting these ideas to Western Europe was the patristic 
tradition of the Church which blended biblical and Platonic ideas and stressed 
the importance of mathematics for an understanding of the structures of crea-
tion.11 Without such a belief there would have been no good reason to suppose 
that the principles of mathematics would have been applicable in any profound 
way to questions about nature. 
Belief in the reflection of God's mind in humans meant that the world was 
in principle comprehensible--that is, it was comprehensible insofar as it could 
be explored.12 Though space travel in the modern sense was unthinkable, apoca-
lyptic writers supposed that the mechanics of the heavens would be comprehen-
sible to someone like Enoch who was enabled by his ascent into heaven to ex-
amine them at close range.13 Against the skepticism of some Greek schools of 
philosophy, Tertullian and Augustine argued that sensory perception was basi-
cally reliable and that the world was comprehensible to the extent that our five 
senses allowed us to experience it.14 Even the inner recesses of the human mind 
were believed to be comprehensible, at least to Augustine, by virtue of God's 
image within it.15 
Faith in the comprehensibility of the world was an essential factor in the 
rise of modern science. This can be seen in the endeavors of early Western 
scientists like the Venerable Bede (early eighth century), A<lelard of Bath 
(twelfth century), Robert Grosseteste (thirteenth century), John Buridan (four-
teenth century), Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton. Copernicus, Galileo, 
Kepler and Newton are generally recognized as the founders of modern sci-
ence. Even though there have been so-called revolutions in twentieth-century 
physics--the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics--mo<lern physics con-
tinues to be based on the method and findings of these early modern pioneers. 
It is diflicult to conceive of modern science developing as it has without 
founding figures like these, but it is just as difficult to imagine any of them 
working with the intensity needed to overcome the obstacles of early modern 
science without the kind of faith in the comprehensibility of the world that they 
had. 
The founders of modern science were doing what Thomas Kuhn has 
termed "revolutionary science": that is, they were seeking answers to problems 
for which they had no reason to suppose (on the basis of existing science) that 
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answers existed.16 In theological terms, they worked by faith more than by 
sight--a faith sustained by their theological understanding of human nature.17 I 
would argue, however, that the revolutionary nature of their work was some-
thing they shared with their early medieval predecessors. Though the para-
digms of modern science were not established until the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, the attempt to reach out into the unknown, beyond what in-
ductively established paradigms would allow, was made by natural philosophers 
in every century of the M iddle Ages. 
Scientists that have succeeded Newton have often been able to follow their 
example without necessarily sharing their religious faith. But those like Albert 
Einstein, who have pioneered radically new paradigms in scientific thought, 
have often accepted the comprehensibility of the world as a tenet of the ir faith 
in God. There is probably no way to establish an exact correlation, but, histori-
cally, revolutionary episodes in science appear to be ones in which faith played 
a significant role. 
Now this epistemic correlate of belief in the image of God tells us two 
things about the understanding of humanity that might we ll enrich AI research. 
It tells us something about the character of the intelligence Al research may 
hope to reproduce, and it also tells us something about the capacity of A l re-
searchers themselves. In other words, we can take the founders of modern sci-
ence as models for the definition of what we mean by human intclligence--mak-
ing the goal of reproducing it seem almost im possible--aft cr all, Al workers 
have their hands full sim ply trying to replicate everyday common-sense be hav-
io r! Or we could take them as mode ls for what we may expect from A l work-
ers ( they, too, are created in the image of God!) and the legi timacy of their 
efforts to accomplish the seemingly impossible. 
SCIENTISTS SUCH AS COPERNIC US AS MODELS OF 
HUMAN INT E LLIGENCE 
The reason for taking the founders of modern science as models for our 
definition of the intelligence Al research aims to reproduce is that they form a 
bridge between classical Christian faith and modern Western science. In the 
lives and work of early modern scientists, the meaning of the theological under-
standing of human intelligence was worked out in such a way that it had impli-
cations for the scientific enterprise--im plications which could not be der ived in 
an unambiguous way from the creeds of the Chu rch themselves. Since this is 
just one way of defining intelligence, o r one part icular aspect of hum an intelli-
gence, I shall earmark it by referring to it as "Copernican intelligence," Cope r-
nicus being perhaps the most widely recognized historical expression of the 
revolutionary sort of intell igence I have in mind. 
If we learn anything about the character of the in telligence Al hopes to 
replicate from these historical exemplifications of theological understand ing, it 
seems to be this: a creature is int elligent (in the Copernican sense) only if it 
makes judgments concerning its own efforts to cope with reality when its very 
ability to cope is in doubt (and recognized to be so) and there arc no induc-
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lively-based paradigms for establishing the probability of success. 
The mere ability o f a machine to seek and to find solutions to problems--
whether by heuristic programs or by semantic information processing or by 
scripts or by stochaistic processes 18--is certainly a necessary condition for intel-
ligence, but not a sufficient one according to our defin ition. Why? Because the 
very possibility of arriving at a solution is never in doubt when the machine is 
programmed to keep trying or to quit according to some pre-determined rule--
a ru le based on the judgment of the Al worker who programmed the machine. 
In other words, problem-solving machines as we know them today can only be 
said to be " inte lligent" or even to "solve problems" in the metapho rical sense. 
For comparison, consider the way we speak of primitive prokaryotic (no n-
nuclcatcd) cells as having "solved the problem" of how to produce energy more 
efficiently or of having " learned the trick" of photo-synthesis. Orthodox sci-
ence today would readi ly admit that this is merely an anthropomorphism, a fig-
ure of speech. Prokaryotic cells arc o nly able to live and reproduce themselves 
(by sim ple subdivision). The fact that some o f them (the blue-green algae) 
evolved in such a way as to produce energy more efficiently was governed en-
tire ly by genetic mutations and environmental co nditions. If in telligence came 
into the picture at a ll , it was that of the Creator, not that of the creature, how-
ever remarkable its accomplishment may have been. 
At a so mewhat higher level, we speak o f mice "solving the problem" o f 
finding the correct way th rough a maze. Again this is a figure of speech. Why? 
Because the propensity of mice to keep searching is due entire ly to basic drives 
conditioned to a degree by past experience. The anticipations and skills they 
employ arc a mere projection based on past experiences of mazes much like 
the o ne at hand. There is no possibi lity of a mouse considering whether, in the 
case o f a radically new situation, there arc grounds for judging whether efforts 
towards a so lutio n arc worthwhile. 
The re is evidence that early hom inids like Hom o erecllls and early Honza 
sapiens ( the Neande rthals) also searched for new habitats and colonized much 
of no rthern E urope and eastern Asia. Perhaps this, too, was simply a matter o f 
basic drives conditioned by the need for survival. Or perhaps the possib ility of 
penetrating the unknown was weighed in relation to the obvious risks involved. 
We don' t know for sure . In any case, migra tion to new habi tats presumably 
took place in small steps, no ne o f which required a significantly greater risk 
that the one before it. Hence, past experience could serve as an indicator of 
the probabil ity of further success. 
A modern-day comparison would be the solution of crossword puzzles. 
D ifficult as these puzzles may be for some of us, their solu tion does no t require 
intell igence in the Copernican sense: we know in advance they were designed 
by human beings using basic patte rns and language that we share on the basis 
of a common culture. 
Or, to take a comparison closer to the to pic of Al, consider the decipher-
ment of enemy codes during World War II. Surely this was a job for " intelli-
gence," as the term is used in the business of espionage. In fact, some of the 
Theological Understanding of /Ju111anity/A1tificial Intelligence 67 
earliesl steps in lhe development of computers were taken in the process of de-
ciphering codes (Turing et a l., late 1930s). But even this is not intelligence in 
the Copernican sense that we arc using lo illustrate the Western theological 
understanding of human nature. In military intelligence work, a cipher is 
always assumed to have a meaning. Anyone who tries to decipher it must have 
confidence in her or his individual ability. Bul the problem is known to be sol-
uble in advance, and its solution is generally thought lo be a matter of time . 
Jn comparison to these exam pies, early scientilic efforls by Copernicus, 
Kepler and Newlon to understand the kinematics and dynamics of the solar sys-
tem was distinctive in that there was neither compulsion nor guarantee of suc-
cess. The history of Western culture could very well have gone on without these 
breakthroughs in science. The effort was highly contingent: it exemplilied the 
way in which humans deline themselves and their abilities--defined, in this case, 
in terms of their faith in the ability of the human mind to understand what God 
had created. 
Perhaps the first indication in the fossil record of intelligence in this spe-
cial, "Copernican" sense is the evidence that Neanderthals provided grave 
goods in the burial of their dead, particularly in the case of children.19 Perhaps 
there was survival value for the group in practices like these, but individuals still 
had to reflect on the meaning and value of practices that could be varied in an 
indefinite number of ways without affecting the immediate material condition 
of the group. In other words, they were attempting to penetrate the unknown 
and questions of belief became a factor in the effort to solve problems for 
which neither environmental conditions nor past conditioning was dctcrmina-
tive.20 
TESTING A FULLY SOCIALIZED COMPUTER FOR 
COPERNICAN INTELLIGENCE 
Under what circumstances could computers exhibit Copernican intelli-
gence? This is still largely a matter for speculation. But a few suggestions may 
be offered if only to keep the ultimate goal in sight and to indicate the enormity 
of the task. 
As philosophers like Hubert Dreyfus have argued, the way in which hu-
mans know things can not be formalized in a way lhat is completely independ-
ent of context.21 Advocates of AI like John McCarthy have recognized the same 
problem.22 Computers that are programmed to exercise certain skills arc com-
pletely unable to cope with situations in which context may change unpredicta-
bly in such a way that the meaning of given stimuli is altered--yielding " ice 
cream," for example, instead of "I scream!"23 
Actually, we have a very simil ar difliculty with our children. We try to 
teach them "manners" for instance. ll is proper for them to use their fingers 
when eating some things, but not when eating others. They may run and jump 
in some contexts, but not in others. There may be no way in which to formalize 
all lhe rules involved, yet our children slowly learn lo make whal we are willing 
to accept as good choices. They become socialized. Of course, some critics 
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argue that children are simply being limited in the scope of their imagination. 
Their creativity may actually diminish as their cultural baggage increases! 
On the other hand, we know that children deprived of human contact in 
their formative years have great difficulty in behaving in socially acceptable 
ways. The same is true for other primates like chimpanzees.24 
So, even if we succeed in building computers with the hardware and built-
in programs that match the capacity of a newborn child--including something 
like a body with five senses and two hands in order to model human interaction 
with the world--we must suppose that a lengthy process of socialization would 
be required before the "intelligence" of the machine would be formed in a way 
that would allow it to function in real-life situations with any degree of suc-
cess.25 Such a machine would have to be able to "grow" as the human brain 
docs. Both its hardware and its software would have to develop as the machine 
learned of its identity and its capabilities through human contact.26 
Indeed, it could take many generations of humans and computers function-
ing together as a group for the human partners even to determine all of the 
hardware and programming requirements for the design of potentially intelli-
gent machines. Design and communal relations would have to evolve together 
phylogenetically before an individual machine would emerge that could achieve 
intelligence ontogenetically. I shall refer to such a hypothetical machine as a 
"fully socialized computer." And, for the sake of the argument, I shall assume 
that the development of such a machine is possible in principle. 
The question then is whether a fully socialized computer would be intelli-
gent. At what point in the co-evolution of design and communal relations 
would, or could, hum ans recognize their computers as equally intelligent? 
Insofar as the historic Western theological understanding of human nature 
is any guide, I would look for the day when computers began to pioneer in ar-
eas of revolutionary science.27 At this juncture their human mentors would no 
longer be infallible guides. Computers and humans would not only share a 
common stock of knowledge, but they would face a common unknown as po-
tentially equal partners. In other words, our relationship to potentially intelli-
gent computers would be something like our relation to our graduate students 
at the point that we recognize them as colleagues. This is not to say that a 
Ph.D. is a necessary condition for intelligence. But the capability of doing inde-
pendent research is assumed of any human with the necessary training as a con-
sequence of their being intell igent. Could a fully socialized computer exhibit 
Copernican intelligence? Could it decide, for instance, that it was wasting its 
time in pursuing a particular problem of revolutionary science--that is, in cases 
where there is insufficient precedent to allow judging on the basis of past expe-
rience? Could it decide that its efforts would better be spent on something 
else? In other words, could a computer articulate a belief system about the na-
ture of its own mind in relation to the real world (not the known world, but the 
real one)? 
On the other hand, could our fully socialized computer choose to go on 
with a research project when its human colleagues had given up--not just out of 
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necessity or a simple projection based on past experience, but on the basis of 
individual judgment? Could it recognize itself as participating in a transcendent 
order of ideas, for instance, or as created in the image of God?28 Could it ex-
hibit greater faith than its creators? 
SCIENTISTS SUCH AS COPERNICUS AS MODELS FOR AI WORKERS 
Considering the founders of modern science as paradigms of the historic 
Western theological understanding of human nature gives us some idea of the 
enormity of the task of reproducing Copernican intelligence in machines. 
However, we must weigh this enormity against that of the capacity of human 
beings to understand and to invent. For this, we must take the early modern 
scientists as models of what we may expect from the AI workers themselves. 
For example, if we consider Kepler in his own context (the early seven-
teenth century), we realize that he was pursuing a nearly impossible, and possi-
bly hopeless, task in trying to find mathematical laws that would describe the 
data of the orbit of Mars collected by Tycho Brahe. We do not always appreci-
ate this fact because we view the matter from the vantage point of the later 
Newtonian science that vindicated Kepler. We know that the orbits arc simple 
geometric figures--ellipscs with the sun at one focus. In retrospect, we can see 
that Kepler had a decent chance of finding a solution since the geometry of 
conic sections was reasonably well known.29 Similarly, the non-Euclidean ge-
ometries Einstein needed to work out his general theory of relativity were avail-
able, even if not so widely known. 
But neither Kepler nor Einstein, themselves, had any logical reason to sup-
pose (on the basis of existing science) that solutions to their respective prob-
lems were at hand. They spent large amounts of time and energy pursuing 
projects that could have been a colossal waste of time! In fact, both Kepler and 
Einstein knew the agony of defeat when cherished ideas turned out to be 
wrong. But they persisted because they believed that abstract geometrics could 
be applied to the real world even though most of their theorems were not de-
rived from everyday experience.30 As Kepler himself put the matter: 
Those laws are within the grasp of the human mind; God wanted us to 
recognize them by creating us after his own image so that we could 
share in his own thoughts .... Only fools fear that we make man godlike 
in doing so; for God's counsels arc impenetrable, but not his material 
creation. 31 
If Al workers today exhibit this same kind of faith, in a curious way they repro-
duce the faith of Kepler and Einstein. They too exhibit what I have called Cop-
ernican intelligence.32 
Whatever the potentialities of matter may be, the potentialities of the hu-
man mind in understanding them are a matter of personal faith. After all, the 
conditions under which our brains were form ed by natural selection millions of 
years ago were not ones in which the deep understanding of the laws of matter 
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were a signilicant facto r. On the basis of natural selection alone there is no 
reason at all to suppose that our minds could ever understand the workings of 
the human mind, or, for that matter, that they could have understood the dy-
namics of the solar system or the large-scale structure of the universe. Insofar 
as we share the fai th of Kepler and Einstein--and insofar as we share the theo-
logical understanding of human nature that lies behind it--wc may also share 
the faith of A l workers and o ther scientists who pursue the quest for under-
standing beyond what the previous history of science would give adequate rea-
son to suppose was likely to succeed. We may share their faith even if we have 
a greater sense of the enorm ity of their self-appointed task. 
Hubert Dreyfus has also drawn parallels between Al research and early 
modern scientists, but, instead of pointing to Kepler and Newton as I have 
done, he points to the alchemical research programs of the Middle Ages and 
Rcnaissance.33 This alternative is equally valid in my view, but it does not prove 
the futility of Al programs as Dreyfus implies. Historians generally recognize 
today that major developments of early modern chcmistry--not just the chemi-
cal apparatus, as Dreyfus suggests, but the theoretical concepts and experimen-
tal results o f early modern chcmistry--would not have been possible without the 
belief structure mediated by alchemical notions. For example, Yan Helm ont's 
thesis, that each clement had a distinctive "chaos" or " gas" that was given off 
when it was heated, was fund amental to all subsequent efforts Lo isolate and 
identify various gascs.34 Far from being a futile effort, alchemy played a posi-
tive, creative role in science at a time when there were no empirically-based 
paradigms to rely on. 
We can not say whether Al wi ll succeed in achieving the goals which it has 
set for itself, but, insofar as it excmplilies the human quest to understand the 
things God has created using the gifts God has given us, it is consistent with the 
theological understanding of humanity as understood historically in Western 
Christendom. 
THE IMAGE OF GOD AND MORAL JUDGMENTS 
(ETHICAL CORRELATE) 
For the sake of simplicity, we often differentiate between intellectual and 
moral questions, or between the faculties of cogni tive and ethical judgment. 
From a theological perspective, however, the two must be related. The re can 
be no real intell igence without consideration of justice. And, o f course, the ex-
ercise of moral judgment requires a cognitive understanding of the world in 
which such judgments arc to be made. Consequently, we must ask whether 
fully socialized computers would be concerned about the morality, as well as 
the feasibility, of their efforts. Or, in terms of the theological virtues, fully in-
telligent beings must exhibit love as well as faith. 
Like the belief in the capacity of hum an mind to understand the world, the 
Western belief in its accountability to a moral order is rooted in the concept of 
God as creator and lawgiver. Christians throughout history have rightly been 
critical o f science when it was pursued out o f self-interest o r even me re ly in the 
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national interest. Such, for instance, was the early Christians' critique of Greek 
science as they knew it.35 And such was the fundamental ethic that motivated 
the pursuit and publication of early modern science. 
For all the credit due Copernicus for his restructuring of our understanding 
of the solar system, it should be remembered that he originally planned to pub-
lish only some astronomical tables and rules of calculation for "common 
mathematicians" and was reluctant to publish the underlying theory and proof 
of his results. This was not out of fear of the Church, by the way, but due to a 
Pythagorean principle of reserving advanced forms of knowledge for personal 
associates and students. The fact that Copernicus did publish the full theory 
was largely due to the insistence of Tiedemann G iese, the bishop of Kulm. 
Against Copernicus, Bishop Giese argued that the Pythagorean practice of se-
crecy had no place in mathematical science and that the latter should be de-
voted to Christ and a gift to the world (for which Christ also gave his li fe ).36 
The fact that the Church later placed Copernicus's work on the Index should 
not be allowed to obscure our indebtedness to Giese and other church officials 
for their positive role in science. 
SCIENTISTS SUCH AS BACON AS MODELS OF INTELLIGENCE 
From a theological perspective, then, true intelligence entails the consid-
eration of how one may conform to the moral law, or in the specifically Chris-
tian sense, how one may follow the example of J esus Christ. In order to paral-
lel our earlier discussion of "Copernican int elligence," I shall refer to this as-
pect of human nature as " Baconian intelligence." It was Francis Bacon, whose 
insistence that science be pursued not for personal gain but for the benefit of 
humanity, who provided the basis for a socially-supported program of scientific 
research in seventeenth-century E ngland. 
As Bacon put it in OJ the Advance111e11t of Leami11g, science should no t be a 
shop for profit or sale, but a storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the 
relief of the human estate.37 Accordingly, the citizens of the New Atlantis, the 
Christian utopia that Bacon set forth as the model of the scientific community, 
daily prayed to God "for the illumination of [their] labors and turning them 
into good and holy uses."38 Baconian intelligence in this sense is the ethical cor-
relate of the theological understanding of human nature as created in the im age 
of God. 
Like the epistemic correlate, the ethical tells us two things that may enrich 
Al research. It tells us something about the character of the intelligence AI 
workers may hope to reproduce, and it tells us something about what we should 
expect from AI workers themselves. 
TESTING A FULLY SOCIALIZED COMPUTER FOR 
BACONIAN INTELLIGENCE 
Under what circumstances, then, could fully socialized computers (assum-
ing again that such machines can be developed) exhibit intelligence in the Ba-
conian sense? I would look for situations in which the need for moral judgment 
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characteristically arises--situations in which various alternative futures would be 
recognized as possibilities, and in which priorities and criteria would have lo be 
developed to deal with the varying costs and benefits to others as well as Lo 
oneself and one's own group. Could a fully socialized computer protest against 
a policy that was advocated by its human associates? 
Could a computer contemplate risking its own well-being in o rder to avoid 
harm or to promote the well-being of a human or of another computer--not 
just because it was programmed to (as Isaac Asimov has imagined in his "First 
Law of Robotics")39 but as a matter of reasoned moral judgment? In other 
words, could a computer recognize itself and others as participating in a moral 
order? Could it conceivably exhibit even greater concern for morality than its 
creators? 
The answer to these questions may depend on the degree to which the Al 
workers themselves exhibit ethical concerns in their work. After all, it is they 
who would function as the "parents" in relation to these new members of the 
community of intelligent beings. Like faith, morality is something that is 
learned from situations and examples. It can not be schematized o r pro-
grammed. T o what extent, then, will AI research be motivated by the desire to 
enhance the environment or alleviate human suffering? T o what degree will Al 
workers address the issues of the social impact of the results of their work? 
The viabil ity of the long-range goals of AI research may well depend on the 
faith and love of the Al community as much as it does on the possibilities al-
lowed by the electronic properties of matter. And, even if Al research fails ulti-
mately to reproduce true intelligence, it may at least force us to develop ne-
glected aspects of our own. That is what a theological understanding of human 
nature can contribute to the enterprise. 
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